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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
Deceased Witness-Prior Testimony Admissible In Subsequent Proceeding
Section 348 of the Civil Practice Act permits testimony of a deceased
witness given at a former action or proceeding to be introduced as evidence in
a subsequent action or proceeding as long as it is between the same parties and
involves the satne subject matter although the action or proceeding may be
different.
The Court in In Re White's WillI s was faced with the problem of determining whether evidence given against testatrix in a lunacy proceeding could
be used as evidence in a proceeding to contest testatrix's will for lack of testamentary capacity. The majority of the Court (4-3) held that the subject matter was
the same in both proceedings, that is, the issue of the mental incompetancy of the
testarix. The requirement that the proceedings be between the same parties was
met because the present proponent (appellant) of the will was joined as a
respondent in the prior lunacy hearing.
The New York statute is an embodiment of the common law rule' 9 that
testimony of a deceased witness may be given if the parties and issues are the
same. This was not an exception to the hearsay rule but rather it did not fall
within the proscription of heresay.20 A reason for the exclusion of hearsay is
2
the inability to bring to the forefront the truth as tested by cross examination. 1
From this it follows that when the issues and the parties are the same, cross
examination, would be directed at the same material points, thus should be an
adequate test for exposing falsehoods 22 No longer would there then be a reason
for excluding the testimony of a deceased witness in a subsequent trial.
The dissent takes issue with the majority's determination that the subject
matter was the same in the lunacy proceeding and in this proceeding to contest
the will of the testatrix. The ultimate issue in the lunacy hearing was the
incompetency at that moment and not one year prior when the will was made
although testimony could be introduced as to the individual's condition for a
period two years prior tO the hearing.23 Furthermore, the dissent continues, even
though one may be incapable of handling his own business affairs because of
insanity or lunacy, he still may be capable of devising his property during a
lucid interval, or if he is suffering delusions, the will may still be valid if the
18. 2 N.Y.2d 309, 160 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1957).
19. Varnum v. Hart, 47 Hun 18, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888).

20. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1370 (3d ed. 1940).
21. Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 50 (N.Y. 1812); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§1362 (3d ed. 1940).

22. 5 WIGNMORE, EVIDENCE §1386 (3d ed. 1940).

23. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §1371.
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devise is not a product of the delusion. 24 This is true even after the appointment
25
of a committee.
It appears to this writer that the Court of Appeals has adhered to Wigmore's
admonitions for liberality 26 in a case not properly calling for the invocation of
section 348 of the Civil Practice Act. It is submitted that the underlying reason for
the necessary admission of this type of testimony is that when the parties and the
issue are the same, the motive for cross examination is allegedly the same in both
proceedings. 27 In the instant case, although the proponent of the will was a party
respondent in the lunacy proceedings, was he moved to cross examine the testimony in regard to the mental incompetency of the testatrix? It might well be
that the proponent of the will agreed that the testatrix could not handle her own
business affairs and that a committee should have been appointed. This however
does not mean that one year prior, when the will was made, that the testatrix
was incompetent to so do, nor does it mean that if the testatrix was incompetent
that she did not have lucid intervals. There was no evidence that the proponent
knew of the will in his favor at the time of the lunacy hearings. There was no
motive, or at least not the same type of motive, for the appellant here to cross
examine at the first trial. He was not appraised that it was to his interest to
attack the testimony. There was no occasion "to inquire into whether . . .
[testatrix's inability to handle ordinary affairs of business] . . had deprived her
of testamentary capacity at the time of the inquiry let alone during the previous
year."28 Because the motivations at the two proceedings were different, the
opportunity for cross examination at the lunacy proceeding was not really
adequate. It therefore should be said that the spirit of section 348 was not met
and not as the majority stated that there was an adequate opportunity and the
failure to take advantage constituted a waiver.
Per Curiam
Improper Cross-examination-In Smith v. Majestic Iron Works, 29 a personal
injury action against plaintiff's employer, defense counsel's questioning whether
plaintiff had any pains or aches when he cashed his compesation checks was held
to constitute reversible error, especially in view of the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury that plaintiff would be required to repay such compensation
out of any money damages awarded to him.
24. Dobie v. Armstrong, 160 N.Y. 584, 55 N.E. 302 (1899).
25. Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, 8 N.Y. 388 (1853).
26. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCe §1387 (3d ed. 1940).
27. For examples of existing similarity of motivation for cross examination
at both trials see, Shaw v. New York Elevated Ry., 187 N.Y. 186, 79 N.E. 984
(1907); Taftv. Little. 178 N.Y. 127, 70 N.E. 211 (1904).
28. In Re White's Will, 2 N.Y.2d 309, 321, 160 N.Y.S.2d 841, 851 (1957).
29. 2 N.Y.S.2d 544, 161 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1957).

